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The government of almost every country has intervened in the mar-
ket pricing of foodgrains to promote price stability. But the rules of
the game are changing as countries abandon trade restrictions and
protectionist policies in the wake of the Uruguay Round agreement
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Will food
prices fluctuate more or less with trade liberalization?
Foodgrain Price Stabilization in Developing Countries: Issues
and Experiences in Asia, Food Policy Review 3, by Nurul Islam and
Saji Thomas, looks at these issues from three perspectives. The first
part reviews the literature and briefly summarizes the macro and micro
policies that governments in developing countries have adopted to
stabilize prices. It also considers alternative policies that do not seek to
stabilize prices per se but deal with the consequences of price insta-
bility for food producers and consumers, such as crop insurance or
futures markets. The second part focuses on the foodgrain price stabi-
lization experiences of five developing countries in Asia, the circum-
stances underlying price stabilization policy for rice and wheat over
time  in  each  country,  and  the  design  and  implementation  of  the
schemes adopted. The  third part examines the  implications of the
policies adopted for future price stability.
Pros and Cons of Stabilization Policies
Traditional  microlevel welfare  analysis  of  price  stabilization  finds
benefits from price stabilization to be small unless consumers and
producers attach great importance to risk aversion. Conventional treat-
ment of risk aversion cannot fully capture the benefits of price stability
to the poor, who place high priority on economic security in order to
ensure minimum subsistence. Moreover, the macroeconomic benefits
of price stability are totally ignored in such an analysis. This gap in
theoretical analysis of price stabilization urgently needs to be filled.
The  most  commonly  used  stabilization  scheme  in  developing
countries is a buffer stock (held by the government) or a combination
of buffer stock and trade policies. To know when to release stocks, a
public agency sets a trigger price. When the price reaches the trigger,
stocks are released to fill the demand so that prices will not rise higher.
When prices are set within a band, the floor price (which protects
farmers) is the price below which grain will not be sold. The ceiling
price is the price above which prices will not be permitted to rise, which
protects consumers. To be viable, the margin between the buying and
selling prices must cover the direct costs of stabilization.
Price  stability  can  also  be  achieved by  varying  imports  and
exports. Distribution becomes crucial to maintaining stability. Im-
ports must be distributed in all regions or prices will rise in the
regions where supplies are short. If trade transaction costs, including
delivery, are high, stockholding may be cheaper than importing.
A system of taxes and subsidies on imports and exports can be
used to shelter domestic prices from variations in world prices. When
the world price rises, an exporting country can impose a marginal tax
on exports to prevent the domestic price from rising proportionally.
An importing country taxes imports when world prices are low and
subsidizes them when world prices rise. When the world price is low,
exports are subsidized. If an objective of the government is to protect
consumers from rising prices, then provision of rations can be an
effective alternative policy. However, identifying target groups and
delivering rations can be difficult and costly.
Objectives of the Five Asian Countries
All of the selected countries—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, the
Philippines, and Thailand—sought to moderate cereal price fluctua-
tions from one season to another and from year to year. However,
this objective was pursued along with other interrelated objectives.
In all five countries the cereal sector played a major role in the
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counted for the largest share in the consumption basket of the poor.
Price stabilization per se—reducing the variability of prices—was
not the sole objective. In general, all five wanted to ensure a floor or
incentive price to producers and a ceiling price to consumers in order
to  protect  the  consumers,  especially  urban  dwellers,  from  high
or sudden rises in food prices. The importing countries—Bangla-
desh,  Pakistan,  and  the  Philippines—were  pushing  for  increased
self-sufficiency in rice or wheat (whichever was their main food
staple). Their governments distributed food at subsidized prices to
designated  consumers  with  varying  degrees  of  effectiveness  and
coverage. Although Thailand’s objective was to ensure low, stable
food prices for civil servants and urban laborers, its highest priority
was to maximize foreign exchange earnings from rice exports by
maintaining high, stable export prices. Pakistan’s rice price objec-
tives were similar to Thailand’s in that rice was an export crop and
not the principal cereal for food consumption (which was wheat).
The experiences of the five countries emphasize that for a price
stabilization program combining buffer stocks with trade policy to be
effective and successful, a few essential conditions have to be met:
• The buffer stock agency must have an assured, flexible access
to adequate financial resources since its requirements cannot
be predicted.
• The buffer stock agency must be in control of the timing of its
purchases and sales. Inappropriate timing would detract from
its ability to influence market prices.
• Public stocks must be expertly managed. Cost-effective pur-
chases and sales must be made and stocks must be rolled over
frequently to avoid spoilage in storage.
• Timely and efficient management is also essential to avoid
counterspeculation, wherein traders, lacking confidence in the
public agency, refrain from buying in times of surplus and buy
rather than sell in times of shortage.
• If publicly held stocks reduce or substitute for private storage,
the  success  of  the  public  effort  is  compromised.  Policies
should encourage private trade; otherwise the costs of public
stock will be higher.
In meeting these criteria, in general, Indonesia was relatively
more successful than other countries. The long-run domestic real
price of rice went down in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thai-
land, whereas in Indonesia and Pakistan there was a moderate up-
ward trend. Instability of domestic food prices was lower than the
variability of world prices in all countries. In several countries, price
variability during the 1980s as a whole was lower than during the
1970s.
Policy Implications
Theoretically, the elimination or reduction of protectionist policies
is  expected  to  help  reduce  instability  in  the  world  market  for
foodgrains because fluctuations in domestic prices will no longer
be shifted to the world market. But world cereal stocks are being
reduced as domestic support programs are withdrawn in developed
countries. In the past, these stocks have helped curb fluctuations
due to drought or other natural causes.
As  per  capita  income  rises,  self-sufficiency  increases  and  the
relative importance of staple cereals in the consumption basket de-
creases. Concern about domestic price stability, including the impact
of world price instability, decreases. However, countries may still seek
to reduce wide variations in food prices by smoothing out fluctuations
with the help of taxes and subsidies on imports or exports around a
long-run trend in world prices, within a flexible price band that changes
in response to variations in underlying demand and supply conditions.
The band should be wide enough to provide adequate incentive for
private stocks, which should play a stabilizing role.
Because public-sector purchasing agencies are  often slow to
react to changes in market conditions, private enterprise should be
encouraged to operate in foreign and domestic markets because it is
quicker to respond to signals. Although reliance on trade policy and
private traders cannot totally do away with the need for public stocks,
residual public stocks can be small. Public trade or stocks can only
be reduced gradually over time as private traders learn to function
effectively in import and export markets. Also, when surpluses or
shortfalls are unusually large, public intervention may be needed to
supplement the efforts of private traders. Domestic buffer stocks may
also be needed to tide the country over a time lag between ordering
of imports and their arrival. Most countries need a safety-net pro-
gram  for  the  poorest  people.  When food  prices  rise  abnormally,
vulnerable groups must be fed through targeted food distribution or
work programs. Also, public procurement at floor prices as a tempo-
rary measure in times of market glut acts as a safety net for produc-
ers.
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